Long-term care insurance research and trajectory by Costa-Font, J. et al.
Vol.:(0123456789)
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice (2019) 44:179–182
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41288-019-00122-0
EDITORIAL
Long‑term care insurance research and trajectory
Joan Costa‑Font1 · Christophe Courbage2 · Joël Wagner3,4
 
© The Geneva Association 2019
The financial risk of facing the costs associated with future needs for long-term care 
(LTC)—i.e., care for people dependent on help with their daily living activities—is 
still largely underinsured. In fact, the cost of LTC can even be catastrophic, result-
ing in ruin for a number of elderly people and their families. Financing LTC risk 
is therefore becoming a pressing issue for many countries confronted with an age-
ing population and growing LTC needs (see, e.g., Fuino and Wagner 2018b). This 
special issue of The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance is devoted to the role of 
insurance in financing LTC, and addresses three topics in particular: the reasons for 
a limited development of LTC insurance markets, the effect of LTC insurance pur-
chase on the financial well-being of individuals, and the major research areas, both 
current and future, in the field of LTC insurance.
While LTC is mainly financed by governments through different types of public 
programmes, the limited level of public coverage, which is often means- or needs-
tested, as well as increasing budgetary constraints have prompted a move towards 
developing insurance designs that address the specific institutional constraints of 
each country (Costa-Font et al. 2015). However, so far the market size for the dif-
ferent LTC insurance schemes has been relatively small in comparison to the very 
substantial amount of private expenditure and the significant level of self-insurance 
by families (Costa-Font 2010). The slow insurance development can be accounted 
for by a number of supply and demand factors, some of which this special issue 
discusses and advances in its study. Such supply factors include questions associ-
ated with risk insurability, asymmetric information and pricing (Fuino and Wagner 
2018a). As for demand factors, potential cognitive biases in risk perception, aware-
ness of caregiving needs and the burden on family (Sloan and Norton 1997), and 
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more especially the crowding out of public assistance (Brown and Finkelstein 2008) 
and of family support (Pauly 1990) are relevant drivers.
The first set of papers published in this special issue investigate further those 
demand-side factors that could explain why the LTC insurance market is limited in 
size, focusing on LTC risk perception and family altruism.
The paper by Martin Boyer, Philippe De Donder, Claude Fluet, Marie-Louise 
Leroux and Pierre-Carl Michaud reports survey evidence on LTC risk mispercep-
tions and demand for LTC insurance in Canada. To assess LTC risk misperceptions, 
they contrast subjective (stated) probabilities with objective (predicted) probabili-
ties of needing help in the form of home care, access to a nursing home and living 
to the age of 85. They find that survey respondents’ misperceptions are quite small 
on average when assessing their LTC risk. Respondents are on average optimistic 
about their need for home care and about their survival probability but pessimistic 
about their nursing home need. They also find that, although misperceptions sig-
nificantly affect both the intention to buy LTC insurance and the actual purchase of 
LTC insurance, they cannot explain the low take-up rate of LTC insurance in their 
sample. Correcting misperceptions would slightly increase LTC insurance take-up. 
Such results suggest that the awareness of risk misperceptions is only one explana-
tion among many others for the small market for LTC insurance.
The paper by Justina Klimaviciute, Pierre Pestieau and Jérôme Schoenmaeckers 
analyses LTC insurance purchase decisions when parents expect to receive assis-
tance from altruistic children. After proposing a simple theoretical model from 
which they construct various hypotheses on the parents’ insurance decision, they 
run an empirical test using data from the U.S., France, Spain, Germany and Israel. 
They find that the effect of children’s altruism is negative in Germany and Israel but 
not significant in the U.S., France and Spain, which possibly suggests that the dif-
ferent forces identified in the theoretical model—i.e., the degree of substitutability 
between informal and formal care, the degree of parental altruism and the intensity 
of risk aversion—offset each other. While family altruism is often cited among the 
factors explaining the thinness of the LTC insurance market, their paper indicates 
that in some countries, particularly in the U.S. and in France, family altruism does 
not play such an important role.
The second set of papers address the limitations of LTC insurance markets from 
a supply-side perspective and, more especially, investigate the role of moral hazard 
and solvency regulation in explaining the high level of LTC insurance premiums 
potentially deterring purchase.
In private LTC insurance markets, moral hazard is central to pricing and the long-
run robustness of the market. Yet there is remarkably little evidence on the extent to 
which moral hazard exists in the presence of LTC insurance. The paper by Tamara 
Konetzka, Daifeng He, Jing Dong and John Nyman uses Health and Retirement 
Study data from 1996 to 2014 to assess moral hazard in nursing home and home care 
use in private LTC insurance. The research employs a combination of propensity 
score matching and instrumental variables approaches. They find evidence of sig-
nificant moral hazard in home care use and a potentially meaningful but noisy effect 
on nursing home use. Their results suggest that policymakers, in designing incen-
tives to promote private LTC insurance ownership, should consider the additional 
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spending associated with moral hazard and potentially incorporate disincentives for 
socially inefficient spending by policyholders.
The paper by Franca Glenzer and Bertrand Achou aims at quantifying markups of 
premiums for LTC insurance due to mortality and morbidity risk. To this end, they 
model a shareholder value maximising insurance company that is subject to sol-
vency regulation. Because liabilities from LTC insurance (which depend on future 
morbidity and mortality) are more volatile than liabilities from annuities (which 
only depend on future mortality), capital provisions to ensure compliance with regu-
latory solvency requirements are higher if an insurance company offers LTC insur-
ance instead of annuities. At the same time, a higher volatility in the LTC insurance 
segment also implies a higher expected payoff to the insurance company’s share-
holders. Their results show that offering LTC insurance increases the upside poten-
tial to shareholders, but that effect is more than offset by a higher need for exter-
nal capital. Consequently, if shareholders are to accept an LTC insurance segment, 
policyholders of an LTC insurance policy need to pay considerable markups, which 
increases the importance of LTC insurance in the insurer’s overall book of business, 
explaining the high level of premium for LTC insurance.
Since financial protection is arguably the primary purpose of any insurance, LTC 
insurance can play an important role in financial planning for the elderly. However, 
there is little empirical evidence on the economic consequences of having LTC 
insurance, apart from its effects mainly on health services utilisation and informal 
caregiver outcomes. The paper by Jing Dong, Fabrice Smieliauskas and Tamara 
Konetzka tries to fill that gap by examining how LTC insurance affects key financial 
outcomes of insured individuals using U.S. Health and Retirement Study data. They 
find that LTC insurance leads to consistently positive effects on assets, consistently 
negative effects on Medicaid and Food Stamp enrolment, as well as parent–child 
financial transfers and ambiguous effects on out-of-pocket medical payments. These 
results suggest that although private LTC insurance does not entirely protect insured 
individuals against large medical expenditures, it improves the general financial 
well-being of insured individuals, potentially by reducing Medicaid-related dis-
incentives to asset accumulation, motivating individuals to save more and reduce 
intergenerational wealth transfers.
Last but not least, the final paper of this special issue by Martin Eling and Omid 
Ghavibazoo provides a structured literature review of LTC insurance using main 
path analysis. They identify three major research areas (financing, demand, and 
insurability) and systematically evaluate them based on standard frameworks. Their 
results illustrate the significant difficulties of insuring LTC both on the demand 
and supply sides, explaining the low contribution of insurance mechanisms to LTC 
financing. They also highlight the potential contribution of combined products that 
bundle the risks and public–private partnerships that integrate LTC into the pension 
systems, thus helping to overcome the insurability limitations. Alternative financ-
ing methods that go beyond the idea of risk pooling (LTC bonds, LTC put options, 
equity releases) are also discussed as a way to improve the sustainability of LTC 
financing.
The papers in this collection inevitably refer to just a few of the many issues 
linked to the role of insurance in covering LTC risk. We are convinced that these 
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papers provide important messages for policymakers and other stakeholders on how 
to efficiently organise and manage the financing of LTC risk. Finally, we express 
our deep gratitude to all the authors who contributed to this issue. We have been 
privileged to benefit from the insights of their research, and we hope that you will 
appreciate reading their contributions to this special issue of The Geneva Papers on 
Risk and Insurance.
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